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Abstract: David Cameron, leader of the British Conservative Party, has tried to bring 
the Conservative Party to a more centrist position, improving its image while also 
producing a conservative post-Thatcher ideological position. His position has been 
helped by poor mid-term electoral performance by the Labour government of Gordon 
Brown. However, support for Cameron’s programme is thin, and depends on success 
in polls and elections. Consideration (1)  of the Conservatives’ recovery in 
comparison with that of the Labour Party between 1979-97, (2)  of electoral 
geography and (3) of the relation between Cameron’s ideology and policy, together 
suggest that a victory in the next General Election will be hard, and that in that case 
Cameron’s position will be precarious. But given the task ahead of the Conservatives, 
it may be that tolerance of failure would be sensible. 
Introduction 
In this paper I will estimate the prospects for the British Conservative Party as David 
Cameron tries to engineer its electoral recovery. Following three consecutive heavy 
defeats, under Cameron, the Conservatives have undertaken a modernisation 
programme to try to regain voter support and trust. This resulted in further resurgence, 
and an opinion poll lead was sustained until Gordon Brown replaced Blair as Labour 
leader and Prime Minister, but many of the measures proposed by Cameron, and 
much of his rhetoric, have proved unpopular within the party. As I have argued in my 
2008 book (written with Andrew Denham) Democratising Conservative Leadership 
Selection: From Grey Suits to Grass Roots, Cameron’s mandate crucially depends on 
his demonstrating electoral success. In the Spring of 2008, Cameron began to make 
inroads into the Labour government’s position, building large opinion poll leads, 
putting in a good performance in the local elections, and winning a by-election in May 
in impressive style. This short period of dominance has helped secure his position, but 
by raising expectations may make it hard for him in the future, especially if Labour 
engineers a recovery. 
After the 2005 election, a report commissioned by Michael Ashcroft, Wake Up and 
Smell the Coffee, laid out the Conservatives’ negative poll ratings in detail. The 
Conservatives were no longer liked, and although they had strong and loyal support, 
their core voters were no longer numerous enough to deliver an election victory. The 
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be reassembled. Cameron won a leadership election with 68% of the votes of party 
members, against David Davis, a more robust politician with strong right wing 
credentials. This was widely perceived as an important step in the Conservatives’ 
recovery process. However, the process of change soon came under attack from the 
right of the party. 
Cameron’s aim is to move the party to the political centre ground. He has always 
conceived of this as a three stage process. First of all, the party should be shown to be 
“nice”. Secondly, an ideological position needed to be marked out. Thirdly, this 
position should then be fleshed out with policy. At the time of writing, stage 3 was 
under way, with a wide-ranging policy development process being coordinated by 
Oliver Letwin. 
The Conservatives have moved to the right since the end of their period of office. This 
has left a great deal of space between them and the centre ground, which has allowed 
Labour to build up a formidable coalition of centrist voters, while the Liberal 
Democrats have been able to pursue a strategy of appealing to voters to the left of 
Labour (e.g. with opposition to the Iraq War), while also wooing the wealthy middle 
class (e.g. opposing tuition fees for university students). Since 1992, there has been a 
pattern of tactical voting, where Labour and Liberal Democrat voters have been 
voting not according to preference, but to ensure the defeat of the Conservative 
candidate. Under the first past the post system (FPTP), this is an important extra 
hurdle for the Conservatives. 
Indeed, electoral geography is currently bad for the Conservatives. They are strong in 
the South East of England, but weaker elsewhere where they find it difficult to win. 
Labour does well where constituencies are small and shrinking, such as the inner 
cities and Scotland, while Conservative constituencies tend to be larger, in rural and 
suburban areas (whose populations are growing). Turnout in Labour seats tends to be 
smaller. All of these factors mean that more votes are required, on average, to elect a 
Conservative than a Labour MP; the Conservatives therefore require an unusually 
large swing from Labour to win the next Election. This is a serious obstacle to the 
Cameron recovery programme. 
In this paper, I will argue that despite the Labour government’s mid-term blues 
Cameron is in a difficult position. First, I shall measure the Conservatives’ progress as 
measured against Labour’s recovery between 1979 and 1997. Second, I shall examine 
the depth of support for Cameron’s programme of change. Third, I shall examine 
internal problems with his ideological programme. 
The Conservative recovery measured against the 
Labour recovery 1979-97 
The Conservatives’ problems are not unprecedented. The Labour government of 
James Callaghan was defeated by Thatcher in 1979, and the Labour Party was seen as 
chaotic, extreme and out of touch. Its immediate reaction to defeat was to move 
further left, under new leader Michael Foot, while Tony Benn pressed for an even 
greater shift. They fought the 1983 Election with a manifesto called by a Labour MP 
“the longest suicide note in history”, and fell to the heaviest defeat of any party since 
1945. 
Under its next leader, Neil Kinnock, the party explicitly decided to move back to the 
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which included an attack on Liverpool City Council, nominally Labour but run by a 
group of Trotskyist entryists of the so-called Militant Tendency. This was 
controversial, but following the speech Labour’s vote began to recover. Its position 
improved a little after the 1987 Election, and it reached rough parity with the 
Conservatives at the April 1992 Election, where the Conservative majority was 
slashed to 21. In September 1992, John Major’s Conservative government was forced 
to withdraw the pound sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, an 
event that destroyed the Conservatives’ reputation for economic competence. By 
October, Labour had established a permanent opinion poll lead. Finally, in 1997, 
came Labour’s ultimate triumph, a landslide with a post-war record majority of 179 
seats. 
There are several things to notice here. First, it took three leaders with different 
qualities (Kinnock, John Smith and Tony Blair) to bring Labour to the centre. Second, 
between Kinnock’s attack on Liverpool Council and Blair’s regaining power, Labour 
suffered two further Election defeats. After the 1987 defeat (with a Conservative 
majority of 102), there were no senior resignations; Kinnock and Bryan Gould, who 
masterminded electoral strategy, continued in post. Defeat was tolerated, because the 
impossibility of winning was understood. 
In all, if we date Labour’s recovery from Kinnock’s 1985 speech, it took 7 years (and 
a major Conservative policy failure) for them to overtake the Conservatives, and 12 
years to return to power. 
The 1997-2005 period for the Conservatives is analogous to 1979-85 for Labour, 
wasted time in which the failure of the strategy of appealing to core voters was 
repeatedly exposed. William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard all 
began by attempting to move the party to the centre, but felt pressurised when they 
could not engineer a recovery in poll ratings, even while alienating traditional 
members. They all reacted by moving back to the right, with Hague symbolically 
fighting European Monetary Union, Duncan Smith opposing the repeal of an unused 
anti-homosexuality law, and Howard attacking illegal immigrants and asylum-
seekers. 
The strategy was not altogether misguided. Commentators have been misled by the 
use of the medical term ‘flatlining’ (when medical instruments register the vital signs 
of a dead patient as a flat line, and a constant sonic tone) as a metaphor to describe the 
Conservatives being stuck at about 30% in the polls. In medical flatlining, the patient 
is dead; it doesn’t get any worse. But in politics, a 30% poll rating can get worse, and 
failure to attract new voters from the centre, while shedding angry supporters to the 
right, could actually produce a temporary or permanent fall even from that low 
position. Hence the “core vote strategy”, as Hague’s team called it – ceasing to target 
the recalcitrant voters of the centre, and reconnecting with the right. This strategy, 
repeatedly used between 1997 and 2005, naturally ensured that the Conservatives did 
not lose more voters, but equally did not gain any either. Though the Conservatives’ 
position had improved by 2005, they were still worse off than Labour were in 1983, in 
terms of the number of their MPs (though not in terms of votes). Victory for the 
Conservatives in 2010 would clearly be a turn-around even greater, because in a 
shorter time, than that managed by Labour. 
Cameron has clearly, and wisely, studied Blair’s style as Leader of the Opposition in 
1994-7, but Blair’s position was obviously better than Cameron’s currently is in a 
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Blair could effectively ignore left-wing voters, whose vote had nowhere else to go. 
However, to the right of the Conservatives there is the anti-EU United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), and the anti-immigration British National Party, who 
between them received about 800,000 votes in 2005 (about 3% of votes cast), and 
each of which is attractive to some disaffected right-wing Conservatives. Cameron 
has already lost one MP and three peers to UKIP. 
Second, in 1994-7, Blair could promise to win the next General Election, so far ahead 
in the polls was he. In contrast, Cameron cannot make, and will not be able to make, 
any such promise. His mid-term dominance of the polls is of course a great help, but it 
should be noted that it dates only from March 2008, and that electoral volatility is 
such that his leadership was being written off in October 2007 when it was thought by 
many that Gordon Brown would call a snap General Election. Brown’s retention of 
the power to set the date of the General Election improves his prospects dramatically. 
Third, Blair inherited a party in a very good position after the efforts of Kinnock and 
Smith; his task was to maximise the size of an already-inevitable victory. Cameron 
inherited a party that was around 5% behind in the polls. 
Fourth, there was relatively little opposition to Blair’s project in the print media, at 
least with regard to his rehabilitation of the Labour Party. Cameron faces implacable 
opposition from some quarters, notably from the Daily Telegraph, and its columnist 
Simon Heffer. 
Fifth, Labour has had its problems. Blair was effectively forced from office. The Iraq 
War has been a disaster, felt most keenly by his own supporters. Gordon Brown badly 
mishandled his decision not to call a General Election in 2007, and compounded the 
problem by brazenly stealing some of the Tories’ flagship policies. He has also 
presided over some difficulties of policy, including the loss of sensitive data about 25 
million people and a botched adjustment of the tax system. Finally, high prices of 
food and oil have forced the economy into a slowdown. But, although there have been 
a few isolated calls to replace Brown and backbench MPs are clearly nervous, Labour 
has not yet (2008) collapsed into incoherence and internal conflict as the 
Conservatives did in 1992-7. 
Sixth, tactical voting meant that Liberal Democrats and Labour supporters would vote 
for each other to keep the Conservatives out. The results in May 2008 are one of the 
first pieces of evidence that this pattern of behaviour, which is very entrenched, is 
breaking down, with Labour voters moving directly to the Conservatives in the by-
election at Crewe & Nantwich to squeeze the Liberal Democrat vote. 
Seventh, Blair’s approach was fresh and exciting in the 90s. However, he was much 
less trusted in 2007 than he was in 1994, and voters have to an extent rejected the 
Blair model of government. Cameron’s claim to be the ‘heir to Blair’ is not as potent 
as it would have been 5 years ago. Poll evidence backs this up: for instance, 45% of 
voters in a YouGov/Sky News poll of June 2007 thought that being ‘heir to Blair’ was 
a bad thing. Fortunately for Cameron, only 15% thought that he was the true ‘heir to 
Blair’. 
The lack of depth of support for Cameron’s 
modernisation programme 
On the surface, Cameron has a big mandate for change. During the long Conservative 
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the Parliamentary Party, and 68% of the votes of ordinary party members, well ahead 
of his chief rival David Davis. But appearances can be deceptive. In fact, in the first 
ballot of Conservative MPs, 104 voted for the right-wing candidates Davis and Liam 
Fox, while only 94 voted for centrists Cameron and Kenneth Clarke. In the second 
ballot, after Clarke was eliminated, 90 voted for Cameron, but 108 voted collectively 
for Davis and Fox. And on the day of the announcement of Cameron’s win in the final 
ballot of party members, a YouGov/Daily Telegraph poll revealed that 48% of those 
members wanted an aggressive right wing agenda, as opposed to 45% who supported 
a move to the centre. One anonymous right-wing MP was quoted as saying that ‘we 
are looking for someone to get us back into government, and Cameron ticks all the 
right boxes’. This was much more a vote for Cameron’s personal qualities, not his 
ideological position. 
Cameron’s centrist project met immediate resistance, coming under serious attack 
from, for example, Janet Daley in a report for the Centre for Policy Studies, and Lord 
Tebbit (who compared Cameron, absurdly, to Pol Pot). But he managed to hold the 
line, arguing in January 2006 that ‘well-intentioned cheerleaders on the right [were 
exerting] a powerful gravitational pull’ but ‘the alternative to fighting for the centre-
ground is irrelevance, defeat and failure.’ 
The initial struggle was over Cameron’s refusal to promise tax cuts well in advance of 
the next Election; Cameron ultimately succeeded in defusing the issue. He also 
imposed an ‘A-list’ of favoured candidates in vacant seats on the party; the A-list was 
partly designed to make the party more representative and presentable, containing 
many women and people from ethnic minorities, as well as being generally younger 
and more articulate than the average Tory candidate. The A-list proved unpopular 
with the independent local Conservative Associations, but it produced results. 
Currently, 17% of Conservative MPs are women (in contrast, 16% are called 
‘David’), but by 2007 about a third of candidates selected to fight the next Election 
were women, many in target seats. He also experimented with innovative ways of 
communicating, using the 2006 Party Conference to introduce WebCameron, a 
blog/podcast site. 
Voters generally found Cameron more congenial than his three predecessors, and the 
poll lead of 5-8% going into the 2007 local elections was primarily due to his personal 
popularity. The local elections were also a qualified success, with the Conservatives 
getting a projected 39% of the national vote, although Cameron’s characterisation of 
the results as ‘stunning’ was clearly an exaggeration. The eighteen months between 
Cameron becoming leader and Blair’s resignation had been fairly successful. 
The period between the local elections at the beginning of May and the accession of 
Gordon Brown at the end of June brought bad news for the Conservatives. There was 
a shaky performance over a speech made by education spokesman David Willetts 
where he withdrew the Conservatives’ traditional support for grammar schools. The 
loud protests against this measure seemed to take the front bench by surprise 
(Cameron had signalled the change in policy many months beforehand), and Cameron 
unwisely fuelled the flames with a very aggressive response to criticism. The result 
was that the party looked divided. The result was a decline in the poll ratings, so the 
Blair era ended with Labour and the Conservatives roughly level in the polls, and 
Brown’s accession resulted in a Labour lead. 
Even though this setback was entirely predictable (and indeed the ‘Brown bounce’ 
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Cameron immediately came under pressure from restive back benchers. Edward 
Leigh, chair of the Public Accounts Committee, and former front-bencher Ann 
Winterton called for changes in policy, while on the eve of Brown’s accession, 
another former front-bencher, Quentin Davies, quit the Tories for Labour and released 
a venomous letter to Cameron explaining his reasons. 
The year since Brown took over has been, to use a cliché, a ‘roller-coaster ride’. A 
massively successful Summer led to a significant Labour lead in the polls, and 
rumours about an Autumn election. This backfired – Brown let the rumours spread, 
and consequently looked weak when he decided not to go to the country. The whole 
fiasco also undermined Brown’s carefully crafted statesmanlike image of the man 
‘above politics’, in that he had clearly encouraged the rumours which were causing 
the Conservatives problems in planning their own tactics. 
Cameron effectively won the leadership of his party during an intense Party 
Conference in 2005. In 2007, once more the Party Conference was the scene of 
drama. At the beginning, Cameron was under severe pressure: the headline in the left-
wing Observer newspaper on September 30
th was ‘Cameron meltdown as public urge 
early vote’. An ad hoc announcement by Shadow Chancellor George Osborne that a 
Conservative government would adjust inheritance taxes proved popular enough to 
make the outcome of an election uncertain, and Brown pulled back from the brink. 
Cameron had been saved from disaster. 
Brown’s problems led to a Tory resurgence, but as late as March the Tory lead though 
constant was small, and right-wing commentators were demanding to know why the 
Tories were not further ahead, given the government’s problems. Cameron was urged 
to make stronger statements about right-wing hot button issues, particularly tax. He 
resisted, and since March capitalised on Labour’s problems to build a significant lead. 
The local elections and the victory of Boris Johnson in the London mayoralty election 
of 2008, and the Crewe and Nantwich by-election shortly afterwards showed, for the 
first time, that Cameron could win over sufficient voters in the North of Britain to 
contemplate winning a General Election. By the Spring of 2008, Cameron was 
sounding notably more confident and aggressive in his treatment of Gordon Brown 
(somewhat undermining his own claim that he would try to follow a less 
confrontational politics). 
His critics have been quietened as a result of these successes. But not silenced. On the 
day that it reported the victory in Crewe, the Daily Telegraph ran an opinion piece by 
prominent blogger Iain Dale demanding a commitment to lower taxes. After the 
excellent local election results, Simon Heffer ran a piece headlined ‘David Cameron, 
prove to me that you’re a Tory’ which claimed Cameron’s success was nothing to do 
with him, and everything to do with the floundering Labour Party. The attacks from 
the right, and the claims that, in Heffer’s words, “the Conservative Party still stands 
for very little, and has slogans where it might more profitably have policies,” will 
continue, and increase in volume if Brown’s electoral position improves. 
Problems with Cameron’s ideological positioning 
Cameron’s task, as I argued in my book After Blair, is to establish a centrist position 
distinct from that of Blair and Brown. To do this, he has ditched many traditional 
Conservative policies, including unwavering support for tax cuts and grammar 
schools, and instead has set out a position based roughly on three principles. First, 
there is an unusual commitment to green thinking, protecting the environment and O’Hara, David Cameron, la Crescita di un Leader  7 
combating climate change. Second, there is localism, the devolution of as much power 
as possible to local communities, non-governmental institutions and the “third sector” 
of voluntary workers. Third, there is the promotion of social responsibility, including 
explicit support for the traditional family structure, and corporate social responsibility. 
This rough position is a departure from the recent Thatcherite mindset, but is, I argued 
in After Blair, consistent with the ‘small-c’ conservative tradition in Britain which can 
be traced back to Edmund Burke. It also differentiates the Conservatives from New 
Labour. 
However, the position does bring problems of its own. Although the policy positions 
are popular with voters, they may not be as supportive of the actual policies that are 
produced by the policy review process to be consistent with them. All three of 
Cameron’s conservative stances are likely to be less popular once the details are made 
clear. People like green ideas in the abstract, but they are resistant to behavioural 
modification – will they be happy to pay a carbon tax, or greater prices on air flights? 
High oil and gas prices (caused by high commodity prices, not green taxes) in 2007 
and 2008 caused much discontent. Similarly, the British like localism, until they see 
the effects of differences in service provision. An obvious corollary of localism is that 
different localities have different priorities and provide different services, but when 
this happens in the UK the result is often unpopular – the media code word for such 
differences is a ‘postcode lottery’. And thirdly, although social responsibility is again 
popular, people do not like the restrictions that result. Recent headlines complaining 
about a £75 fine for someone guilty of throwing away an apple core are typical. 
Furthermore, Cameron’s message is not getting across as he would like. Poll results 
are not encouraging. For instance, a YouGov/Economist poll of June 2007 showed 
that only 27% of people thought Cameron would improve the NHS, while 41% 
thought he would not, and 30% thought he would improve schools against 35% who 
thought not, even though health and schools have been particular focuses for 
Cameron. Worryingly, only 28% thought he would take effective action to reduce 
climate change, while 31% thought he would not. Indeed, 41% did not know, even 
after the efforts Cameron has made in this direction. Worse, these poll numbers are 
remarkably similar to Brown’s, even though the whole point of Cameron’s promotion 
of green thinking was to upstage Brown. On the other hand, 38% think that Cameron 
will reduce immigration, against 27% who think he won’t, despite the fact that 
Cameron has constantly avoided this policy area. Many people still associate the 
Conservative Party with its traditional policy profile. This has been helpful in many 
respects; more recent polls show that the Conservatives are more trusted on the 
economy, reversing a long-standing Labour lead. 
David Cameron’s position has improved with the decline in Gordon Brown’s 
fortunes. Senior Labour insiders argue that once Cameron’s policies come under 
scrutiny, he will be seen as a lightweight, and Brown will gain as a result. Also, 
Brown will choose the moment of the General Election, which is an important power. 
At the time of writing, Cameron’s ascendancy, though impressive, has lasted for a few 
weeks, and it is impossible to extrapolate ahead even a few months. Such is the 
volatility of the electorate, Cameron’s continued success cannot be guaranteed. In 
May 2008, his position was better than that of any Conservative leader since Margaret 
Thatcher’s best days – but only eight months earlier he was being written off. Much 
uncertainty remains about his policy positions, and it cannot be claimed that voters 
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Conclusions 
To conclude, electoral geography, history and ideological reflections combine to 
suggest it is still uncertain that David Cameron will lead the Conservatives to victory 
at the next General Election. Failure to improve on the 2005 result would be 
disastrous for Cameron, while victory would be a magnificent achievement. But at the 
moment it remains very possible that Cameron will dramatically reduce Labour’s 
majority, while leaving Brown as Prime Minister. 
That would not be a bad result for Cameron, and we have seen that tolerance for Neil 
Kinnock’s failure to win in 1987 eventually paid dividends for the Labour Party. The 
next election may be the Conservatives’ equivalent of 1987. But as I have argued in 
this paper, support for Cameron is thin. If he does not win the next election, he will be 
under severe pressure to go. 
In his favour, many candidates from the A-list will be MPs in the next Parliament. 
Their position will be crucial. The leadership rules of the Conservative Party say that 
the leader can be challenged if 15% of MPs write to the Chairman of the 1922 
Committee of Conservative backbenchers demanding a confidence vote. If that 
happens, a vote is taken which will either cement the leader in his job, or remove him 
from it. Given that background, Cameron will be pleased if the next Parliamentary 
Conservative Party is packed with a number of new MPs who in effect owe their 
position to his attempts to modernise the party. 
Against that, the successes of May 2008 have raised expectations of a victory. These 
high expectations, given the Conservatives’ still-precarious position, will be 
dangerous for Cameron if they are not achieved. Despite the complete lack of 
evidence that voters are demanding a ‘return to Thatcherism’, many commentators, 
and party members, will blame a failure at the next election on Cameron’s 
modernisation programme. In fact, Conservative modernisation is their best hope, but 
– as often in British politics – the determining factor will be the performance of the 
Prime Minister. Oppositions do not win elections, governments lose them. 
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